2012 Dewey Lecture: Making Meaning Together Beyond Theory and Practice by Garrison, Jim
Education and culturE 29 (2) (2013): 5-23    5
2012 dEwEy lEcturE: Making MEaning 
togEthEr BEyond thEory and PracticE
Jim Garrison
aBstract
Educators frequently fret over how to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice. In an important sense, it is a false problem. Theory is simply the 
thoughtful, reflective phase of good practice. We will approach Dewey’s phi-
losophy as one of continuous creation and re-creation or even more precisely, 
social co-creation, that requires making meaning, knowledge, and value 
together. We will look at each one of these three in some detail along with 
the ways they transact with one another. Fundamentally, we can only dis-
tinguish them for some purposes, but never fully separate them. Everywhere 
we look, we will see we cannot entirely pull theory and practice apart. There-
fore, the paper will conclude that if we unify theory with practice, we may 
use the same paradigm for the intelligent production of meaning, knowing, 
and valuing, thereby obviating the functional independencies among them.
The reason the title of my paper is not Making Meaning Together Bridging Theory 
and Practice is that there is nothing to bridge. Theory and practice are simply sub-
functions within the larger function of making meaning, knowledge, and value in 
our lives, although few thinkers have ever conceived it as such. The philosophy of 
John Dewey is a striking exception. Theory and practice unite within his account 
of production, or if you prefer, his account of construction and reconstruction. It 
indicates a constructivism far beyond anything found in the contemporary educa-
tional conversation. In “Construction and Criticism,” Dewey writes, “I have used 
the word construction rather than creation because it seems less pretentious. But 
what I mean by it is the creative mind, the mind that is genuinely productive in its 
operations.”1 It is not too much to call Dewey’s philosophy one of continuous cre-
ation and re-creation, or even more precisely, social co-creation. We make mean-
ing, knowledge, and value together.
We begin with a discussion of the role of theory before turning to practice 
and production in that order. Admittedly, it is something of a disjointed mechanical 
treatment, since the proper relation of theory, practice, and production constitutes 
a mutually interdependent functional relationship.
Significantly, the word theory derives from the classical Greek theoria, mean-
ing “viewing, speculation, contemplation, the contemplative life.”2 It is associated 
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with theoros, meaning a spectator at a game. The Greeks assumed a dualistic sepa-
ration between two modes of being, one lower and the other higher. The higher 
realm was comprised of pure, perfect, and immutable forms or essences knowable 
with absolute certainty, but only by means of pure speculative thought. In contrast, 
there was the empirical realm of nature comprised of contingent, mutable, and un-
certain events about which we may only make crude trial and error conjectures. 
To preserve its purity, theoria must operate apart from experience, thereby mak-
ing it necessary to detach reason from the corporeal body that is not only itself a 
corrupted thing of nature, but also the source of distorting passions.3 Early in his 
career, Dewey called such putative a priori pure thinking “apart thought” because 
it supposedly existed apart from anything empirical.4 
To preserve pure thought it was also necessary to disconnect it from prac-
tice or production. Detached from the world, the spectator stance of thinking and 
knowing yielded the mind versus body, subject versus object, and knower versus 
known dualisms. In the history of western thought, pure speculative reason con-
tinued to completely sever itself from empirical investigation until the emergence 
of scientific inquiry, with its emphasis upon experiential practice in producing 
knowledge. For Dewey, the scientific method is continuous with intelligent method 
however unrefined. If we think of experience and experiment in the etymological 
sense of “to make a trial, proof, or a test,” it is an extension of what good practitio-
ners have always done anyway.
Theoria seeks episteme or indubitably certain truth, thereby yielding what 
Dewey calls the quest for certainty that still dominates western thought. Drawing 
on the etymology of the word, Dewey calls such an understanding of theory the 
spectator view. He contrasts it with his own Darwinian participatory stance, which 
assumes we construct our thoughts from the same contingent ever-evolving events 
of existence upon which we cogitate. By contrast, it is the task of pure speculative 
reason to position the knower for a perfectly clear and distinct view of the spectacle 
of absolute, fixed, and final essences. Dewey denies the very idea of nous and the 
possibility of immediate indubitable noetic intuitions of truth.5 For him, all think-
ing is dianoia; that is, a discursive mediated trace of empirical inferences and logical 
implications, which is not to deny the existence of immediate anoetic intuitions.
What theory contributes to practice and production is intelligence, which is 
why we must find a way to preserve it. However, theory cannot make its contribution 
by remaining pure speculation detached from worldly doing and making. We may 
reconnect intelligence to the world by repositioning it within human experience 
and then radically reconstructing it. Once we do so, we will realize that “that mode 
of practice which is called theorizing emancipates experience.”6 Let us look at how 
Dewey integrates theory into the messy and contingent empirical world of practice.
According to Dewey, “the great vice of philosophy” is intellectualism.7 This 
vice is at least as serious as dualism. Here is what he means by it:
2012 dEwEy lEcturE    7
Volume 29 (2) 2013
By “intellectualism” as an indictment is meant the theory that all experi-
encing is a mode of knowing, and that all subject-matter, all nature, is, in 
principle, to be reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identi-
cal with the characteristics presented by refined objects of science as such. 
The assumption of “intellectualism” goes contrary to the facts of what is 
primarily experienced. For things are objects to be treated, used, acted 
upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known. 
They are things had before they are things cognized.8
We cannot think about existence until we have first experienced it. Primitively, 
experience is what happens to a sentient creature in its reciprocally trans-forming 
trans-actions with its natural environment, including the human created world of 
language and institutions we call culture. Dewey further indicates:
When intellectual experience and its material are taken to be primary, 
the cord that binds experience and nature is cut. That the physiological 
organism with its structures, whether in man or in the lower animals, is 
concerned with making adaptations and uses of material in the interest 
of maintenance of the life-process, cannot be denied. . . . Hence, unless 
there is breach of historic and natural continuity, cognitive experience 
must originate within that of a non-cognitive sort.9
We bear many relations to existence, including joy, despair, horror, reverence, 
amusement, fear, confusion, and hope. Such experiences, inarticulate in themselves, 
give meaning, knowledge, and value their context. We carry out artistic practices 
that produce meaning, knowledge, and value to improve or at least ameliorate our 
noncognitive relationships with the world. We may also take immediate consum-
matory aesthetic delight in what we have made even as we continue to appreciate 
their mediating properties.
Let us now turn to Dewey’s reconstruction of theoria. The following passage 
comments on pure reason as it has come down to us across the millennia:
Reasonableness or rationality has, however, been hypostatized. One of 
the oldest and most enduring traditions in logical theory has converted 
rationality into a faculty which, when it is actualized in perception of first 
truths, was called reason and later, Intellectus Purus. The idea of reason as 
the power which intuitively apprehends a priori ultimate first principles 
persists.10 
For Dewey, all reasoning is practical means-ends reasoning carried out for the 
consequences it helps produce. That is why he writes: “Rationality as an abstract 
conception is precisely the generalized idea of the means-consequence relation as 
such.”11 Dewey radically reconstructs theoria in terms of practical reasoning.
The result of Dewey’s reconstruction is a new organum, a new tool of intel-
ligence, newer still than the novum organum Francis Bacon proposed to overcome 
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Aristotelian logic. Regrettably, many commentators confuse Dewey’s instrumen-
talism with that of Aristotle and Bacon. The confusion extends to his understand-
ing of science. While Dewey denies theoria’s traditional status as pure intellect, he 
does preserve its function by reconstructing it in terms of ideas operating inside 
practical means-ends reasoning. Falsifiable nonexistential ideas established by prior 
inquiry, along with ideas in the guise of provisional hypotheses, guide inquiry. All 
inquiry is theory-laden. We may say the same for the role of ideal ends-in-view. All 
inquiry is also value-laden.
Let us pause to recall some of the frequently overlooked characteristics of 
Dewey’s theory of inquiry. Inquiry always begins with some existential problematic 
situation; we do not begin with a cognitive problem. Dewey mentions that it “is a 
familiar and significant saying that a problem well put is half-solved. To find out 
what the problem and problems are which a problematic situation presents to be 
inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry.”12 The situation is problematic because 
it disrupts our functional coordination, thereby giving rise to needs and desires for 
something that will restore functioning.13 The task of inquiry is to re-coordinate the 
situation. Proposed nonexistential ideal ends-in-view provide the tentative, hence 
revisable, aim, goal, or value of the inquiry. The coordination of actual existential 
means and actual existential ends constitutes the aesthetic form of the existential 
situation that is the end or consequence of inquiry.14
Here is Dewey’s definition of inquiry: “Inquiry is the controlled or directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situ-
ation into a unified whole.”15 The means constitute the existential end of inquiry, 
for without the means the end would not exist. Likewise, there are no means until 
we secure the end.
What may most surprise many is how important aesthetics is to the forgo-
ing reconstruction. However, once we recall that theory and practice unite within 
Dewey’s account of production, the surprise dissipates. We may start with Dewey’s 
statement about those most abstract of cognitive things—ideas: “The idea is, in 
short, art and a work of art. As a work of art, it directly liberates subsequent action 
and makes it more fruitful in a creation of more meanings and more perceptions.”16 
“We cannot grasp any idea,” he writes, “until we have felt and sensed it, as much 
so as if it were an odor or a color.”17 In a chapter in Experience and Nature titled 
“Experience, Nature and Art,” Dewey insists that we must understand the impor-
tance of “putting art and creation first.”18 For those who can:
It would then be seen that science is an art, that art is practice, and that 
the only distinction worth drawing is not between practice and theory, but 
between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and 
immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meanings.19
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As indicated earlier, theory renders production intelligent. However, once fully in-
tegrated into creative production, practice tests and refines theory. The same holds 
for reason and intelligence themselves; they too are alterable according to the trials 
and refinements of practical experience. It is a virtuous circle.
Once we put art first and completely integrate theory into practice for the 
artistic purposes of intelligently producing and aesthetically appreciating meaning 
and value, many things become perspicuous. For instance:
When this perception dawns, it will be a commonplace that art—the mode 
of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed 
possession—is the complete culmination of nature, and that “science” is 
properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue. 
Thus would disappear the separations that trouble present thinking: divi-
sion of everything into nature and experience, of experience into practice 
and theory, art and science, of art into . . . menial and free.20
We will return to discuss the division of menial versus free art. Here, however, it 
might be helpful to our subsequent discussion of Dewey’s reconstruction of theo-
ria and the recreation of practical reason to say more about the collapse of the art 
versus science dualism.
If there is any one error that is the primary source of misreading Dewey, it 
is confusing his theory of inquiry and science with the entirety of his philosophy. 
The error commonly confounds itself by confusing his theory and value-laden 
philosophy of science with scientism. For Dewey, “Scientific thought is . . . in its 
turn, a specialized form of art.”21  It is the art of producing well-warranted asser-
tions. Now we may understand why “science itself is but a central art auxiliary to 
the generation and utilization of other arts.”22 Dewey declares that in “concrete 
operation, education is an art. . . . If there were an opposition between science and 
art, I should be compelled to side with those who assert that education is an art. But 
there is no opposition, although there is a distinction.”23 The distinction is simply 
that the specialized art of science confines itself to producing warranted assertions 
useful to other arts, such as teaching. 
Let us return to Dewey’s reconstruction of theoria and practical reasoning 
with the following quotation: 
To be a man [sic] is to be thinking desire; and the agreement of desires is 
not in oneness of intellectual conclusion, but in the sympathies of passion 
and the concords of action:—and yet significant union in affection and 
behavior may depend upon a consensus in thought that is secured only 
by discrimination and comparison.24 
This passage echoes the Nichomachean Ethics, where practical, not pure, reason 
rules supreme even for Aristotle. Desire has been a constituent part of practical 
reasoning since antiquity. Consider the following diagram:
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Desire  I desire V. 
Deliberation U is the means to V. 
   T is the means to U. 
   N is the means to T. 
Perception  N is something I can do here and now. 
Choice  I choose N. 
Action  I do N.
Here “I” is a person, “V” is a value, and U through N are means involving action. 
Note the initiating role of desire, along with the place of perception, in the conclu-
sion. Given this course of reasoning, one ought to choose the possibility N and act 
on it. The ought here has moral force; it serves as a norm for judging the value of 
the choice. In his essay “Moral Theory and Practice,” Dewey comments that “limit-
ing the question as best I can, I should say (first) that the ‘ought’ always rises from 
and falls back into the ‘is,’ and (secondly) that the ‘ought’ is itself an ‘is,’—the ‘is’ 
of action.”25 For Dewey, the is of intelligent action involves reconstructing theoria 
and integrating it into his reconstructed theory of practical means-ends reasoning 
within his larger theory of inquiry. We will return to Dewey’s unique understand-
ing of the role of inquiry in transforming an is into an ought when we take up the 
creation of values.
Intelligent practice requires more than the abstract universal principles of 
pure logic or even what works according to the latest scientific research. Applying 
universal principles alone cannot realize the unique purposes of practical reason-
ing. If it did, how would we know which one to apply in particular, unique, and 
one-time-only teaching contexts? We would need more principles, but then how 
do we know when to apply these? We would need still more principles and so on 
forever. We have started a vicious infinite regress. It is precisely this kind of regress 
that led the first authority on practical reasoning, Aristotle, to conclude over 2300 
years ago that “these are matters of perception. If we are to be always deliberating, 
we shall have to go on to infinity.”26The intuitive discernment rests with the per-
ception of something had before it is fully cognized. At such moments, aesthetic 
sensitivity contributes to intelligent thought and action. Dewey recovers Aristotle’s 
wisdom about practical reasoning even as he rejects the very idea of pure rational-
ity. In Qualitative Thought, Dewey states that “intuition precedes conception and 
goes deeper.”27 Notice that here anoetic intuition precedes conception, but as we 
have seen, it also concludes a course of reasoning. Thus, it is often as important to 
be somebody, a competent practitioner, than it is to know the rules of what works 
or be able to reason well.
We must not cut thought, reason, or, Dewey’s much preferred word, intelli-
gence off from our living involvements, needs, desires, interests, perceptions, cares, 
and concerns, which set the context of practice. There is also an important role for 
imagination and emotions other than desire. He declares:
2012 dEwEy lEcturE    11
Volume 29 (2) 2013
Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various compet-
ing possible lines of action. It starts from the blocking of efficient overt 
action. . . . Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various 
lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making vari-
ous combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what 
the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is 
in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by tentative 
rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical facts outside the body. . . . 
An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable.28 
Notice the role of embodied impulses and habits along with imagination in delib-
eration. We will come back to the role of experiment later. Besides the emphasis on 
creative imagination in inquiry, Dewey invokes embodied innate impulses as well 
as acquired habits. Unlike putatively pure reason, practical means-ends reasoning 
is embodied and impassioned.29 
Desire is constitutive of deliberation, but all emotions may potentially enter 
into the process. Consider:
The conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate phase of action can 
be or should be eliminated in behalf of a bloodless reason. More “pas-
sions,” not fewer, is the answer. To check the influence of hate there must 
be sympathy, while to rationalize sympathy there are needed emotions of 
curiosity, caution, respect for the freedom of others—dispositions which 
evoke objects which balance those called up by sympathy.30
To preserve itself pure reason must not commune with bodily fluids. What Dewey 
says about rational consciousness in philosophical idealism holds for all such dis-
embodied dreams:
So, one asks, what is to become of idealism at large, of the wholesale un-
specifiable determination of “reality” by or in consciousness, if . . . beings 
with bowels and brains, are found to exercise influence upon the character 
and existence of reals?31 
Pure reason shuns practice least it acknowledge its animal relations with the world. 
It cannot make love. It can neither produce nor reproduce. It creates nothing at all 
unless it is confusion.
The following passage helps us see that not only complex passions, but also 
innate animal impulse, are involved in scientific method:
“Reason” as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of 
dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, 
frankness, pursuit. . . . The elaborate systems of science are born not of 
reason but of impulses at first slight and flickering; impulses to handle, 
move about, to hunt, to uncover, to mix things separated and divide 
things combined, to talk and to listen. . . . Reason, the rational attitude, 
E&C    EduCation and CulturE
12    JiM garrison
is the resulting disposition, not a ready-made antecedent which can be 
invoked at will and set into movement.32
Notice the phrase, “the rational attitude, is the resulting disposition, not ready-
made” (op. cit.). Reason itself is among the emergent ever-evolving products of 
practice initiated by innate impulse (i.e., first nature), but rendered more or less 
intelligent by acquired habitual dispositions (i.e., second nature).
Dewey’s reconstruction of theoria has social and political aspects that help 
identify the source of the theory and practice dualism:
The actual conditions of life in Greece . . . set up a sharp division between 
doing and knowing, which was generalized into a complete separation of 
theory and “practice.” It reflected, at the time, the economic organization 
in which “useful” work was done for the most part by slaves, leaving free 
men relieved from labor and “free” on that account. That such a state of 
affairs is also pre-democratic is clear.33 
This pre-democratic social class division remains to haunt teachers whose tasks 
many consider menial rather than free.
Dewey decries what he calls “the segregations of educational values,” of which 
that between the high culture of liberal studies and the utility of practical vocational 
education are “probably the most fundamental.”34 He declares:
While the distinction is often thought to be intrinsic and absolute, it is re-
ally historical and social. It originated, so far as conscious formulation is 
concerned, in Greece, and was based upon the fact that the truly human 
life was lived only by a few who subsisted upon the results of the labor of 
others. This fact affected the psychological doctrine of the relation of in-
telligence and desire, theory and practice. It was embodied in a political 
theory of a permanent division of human beings into those capable of a 
life of reason and hence having their own ends, and those capable only 
of desire and work, and needing to have their ends provided by others.35 
What he says about liberal education and vocational education readily extends to 
the vocation of teaching. Too often, it is assumed that teachers engage in pedagogi-
cal practice while others capable of the life of reason, such as government bureau-
crats, university professors, and educational researchers provide the teacher with 
the ethical and pedagogical ends or goods of their practice along with the means 
for achieving them promulgated by government “what works” websites.36 In Expe-
rience and Education, Dewey remarks:
Plato once defined a slave as the person who executes the purposes of another. . . . 
There is, I think, no point in the philosophy of progressive education which is 
sounder than its emphasis upon the importance of the participation of the learner 
in the formation of the purposes which direct his activities in the learning process.37 
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Sadly, we may say today of teachers what Dewey says of students. 
Action, or more exactly the functional coordination of action, lies at the core 
of the very idea of pragmatism. After all in classical Greek pragma means “deed, act, 
concrete expression of praxis.”38 Practice derives from the Greek praxis, meaning 
“doing, transaction.”39 For Aristotle, when praxis follows from deliberate choice, we 
may judge it moral or immoral. According to Peters, the Greeks largely confined the 
scope of practice to “ethics and politics, which have as their object the good that is 
aimed at by action.”40 Greek aristocrats conceived politics as a free leisure activity 
that at least approached pure theoretical contemplation. The rest of what we would 
today call practice was left to the artisans who cultivated practical reason for the 
sake of creative production. Beneath the artisans in Greek society were the slaves 
engaged in ponos, meaning hard labor involving stress and suffering. They took the 
entirety of their means and ends from others.41 Traditionally, “as livelihood and 
leisure are opposed,” Dewey remarks, “so are theory and practice, intelligence and 
execution, knowledge and activity.”42 
As Larry Hickman, the director of the Center for Dewey Studies, points out, 
“the activities of praxis included for the Greeks neither theoria nor the produc-
tive activities of the craftsman.”43 Let us start with how Dewey connects theory 
to practice. We have seen how he reconstructed the character of theoria, but we 
need one more thing before we can understand how he integrates it into practice. 
Earlier we remarked that the ancient Greeks had a theory of experience, but they 
confined it to the lower, contingent, and changeable realm of existence completely 
apart from the higher realm of absolute being accessible only by pure speculative 
contemplation.44 Dewey thought it took a revolution, the scientific revolution, to 
unite theory and practice:
The division of the world into two kinds of Being, one superior, accessible 
only to reason and ideal in nature, the other inferior, material, changeable, 
empirical, accessible to sense-observation, turns inevitably into the idea 
that knowledge is contemplative in nature. It assumes a contrast between 
theory and practice which was all to the disadvantage of the latter. But in 
the actual course of the development of science, a tremendous change has 
come about. When the practice of knowledge ceased to be dialectical and 
became experimental, knowing became preoccupied with changes and 
the test of knowledge became the ability to bring about certain changes. 
Knowing, for the experimental sciences, means a certain kind of intelli-
gently conducted doing; it ceases to be contemplative and becomes in a 
true sense practical.45
Stated somewhat differently:
The experimental method of scientific inquiry broke down the wall that 
had been erected between theory and practice. Knowing was not Theoria, 
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the contemplation of pure and complete Being, free from even the slight-
est trace of “practical” activity. Knowing involved some kind of doing 
and making. It turned away from immutability toward process, change.46
Systematic experimentation is a practical activity. It is precisely what was lacking 
in ancient Greek science. Although they respected experience, they took it “as is,” 
as Dewey states, and “made no attempt to modify it radically before undertaking 
thinking and theorizing about it.”47 Knowing involves systematically transforming 
experience, not taking it as given. 
Experimental action unifies theory and practice such that we may artfully 
use theoretical ideas as a mode of practice, thereby emancipating experience:
Since the root of the traditional conception of philosophy is the separa-
tion that has been made between knowledge and action, between theory 
and practice, it is to the problem of this separation that we are to give at-
tention. Our main attempt will be to show how the actual procedures of 
knowledge, interpreted after the pattern formed by experimental inquiry, 
cancel the isolation of knowledge from overt action.48 
Galileo did not go down from Florence to the armory in Padua only to tell the ar-
tisans their business, he also went to learn his. Government and university based 
researchers and theorists of teaching should have a similar attitude.
Let us now turn to the unity of theory and practice in production. Techne is 
the skilled knowledge of poiesis, that is, making, creating, or calling into existence 
as Diotima teaches Socrates in the Symposium (205b). Hickman reminds us that, 
“techne was for the Greeks a pro-duction, a leading toward, and a con-struction, a 
drawing together, of various parts and pieces in order to make something novel.”49 
Dewey remarks, “the reproduction of the order of natural changes and the percep-
tion of that order were at first close together, so close that no distinction existed 
between art and science. They were both called techne.”50 He also asserts, “art de-
notes a process of doing or making. This is as true of fine as of technological art.”51 
The unity of theoria and praxis in techne takes us to the heart of pragma-
tism. Consider:
There is a contemporary philosophic movement, popularly known as 
pragmatism, which, discontented with the current separation of theory 
and practise [sic], knowledge and action, regards thought and the beliefs 
which proceed from it as themselves modes of action and strives to envis-
age them in their directive office in conduct. . . . It marks a return to the 
idea of philosophy which prevailed when reflective thought was young 
and lusty, eager to engage in combat in the public arena, instead of living 
a sheltered and protected life. In those days science and philosophy had 
not parted ways because neither of them was cut loose from the arts. One 
word designated both science and art: techne.52 
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Pragmatism reconstructs reason as the intelligent phase of the production of mean-
ing, knowledge, and value. Pragmatism is not for the leisure class; its experimental-
ism means we cannot do everything from our study. We might need to do action 
research to enhance our pedagogical creativity or engage in politics to improve 
educational policy. 
We now want to take up the unity of theory and practice in production. First, 
though, we need to identify another error that rivals dualism and intellectualism. 
Dewey thought meaning, knowledge, and value were all products of our creative 
activity. We must distinguish between the raw existence of meaningless events 
and qualities from the essences we create by means of our participation in them. 
“Essence is never existence,” as Dewey expresses it, “and yet it is the essence, the 
distilled import, of existence.”53 It is rather like distinguishing between existen-
tial grapes on the vine and the essence of the grapes for human purposes—wine.54
Dewey uses the phrase “the philosophic fallacy” to designate the crucial error 
of converting “eventual functions into antecedent existence,” whether “performed 
in behalf of mathematical subsistences, esthetic essences, the purely physical order 
of nature, or God.”55 It is the last mentioned that perhaps accounts for the marginal-
ization of Deweyan philosophy. Norms and values, including the summum bonum, 
whatever you may take that to be, are all contingent constructions. Hence, they 
are subject to deconstruction, reconstruction, and outright destruction. There are 
no absolute ends in themselves anywhere in Dewey’s philosophy. Let us now take 
up the making of meaning followed by the objects of knowledge and concluding 
with the creation of value.
What do teachers produce; better by far, what do they create? The Deweyan 
replay is “body-minds” capable of endless growth. Dewey distinguishes three emer-
gent plateaus. The first two are the “physico-chemical activity of inanimate bodes” 
and the “psycho-physical,” which denotes the conjunctive presence in activity of 
need-demand-satisfaction.”56 Here is how Dewey characterizes the highest plateau:
But body-mind simply designates what actually takes place when a liv-
ing body is implicated in situations of discourse, communication and 
participation. In the hyphenated phrase body-mind, “body” designates 
the continued and conserved, the registered and cumulative operation of 
factors continuous with the rest of nature . . . while “mind” designates the 
characters and consequences which are differential, indicative of features 
which emerge when “body” is engaged in a wider, more complex and in-
terdependent situation.57 
Body-minds emerge when linguistic functioning supplements bodily functioning.58 
In what follows, Dewey describes the primordial act of acquiring linguistic 
meaning; those already familiar with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s slab game59 already 
know the shtick:
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A requests B to bring him something, to which A points, say a flower. There 
is an original mechanism by which B may react to A’s movement in point-
ing. But natively such a reaction is to the movement, not to the pointing, not 
to the object pointed out. But B learns that the movement is a pointing; he 
responds to it not in itself, but as an index of something else. His response 
is transferred from A’s direct movement to the object to which A points.60
In this transaction, A, B, and C all undergo transformation as the object (e.g., a 
flower) begins to emerge as a common referent that allows them to coordinate their 
conduct together. We may think of A as a teacher, B as a student, and the object C 
as some subject matter. Meaning emerges in the process:
Language is made up of physical existences; sounds, or marks on paper, 
or a temple, statue, or loom. But these do not operate or function as mere 
physical things when they are media of communication. They operate in 
virtue of their representative capacity or meaning.61 
We are at the very core of Dewey’s social constructivism: “Through speech a per-
son dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many 
roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. 
Thus mind emerges.” 62 Minds are made when bodies acquiring meaning. Teach-
ers contribute to the creation of body-minds by coordinating subject-matter with 
their students. Meaning is co-created. We make meaning together. 
Linguistic interactions are reciprocally trans-forming transactions. The rela-
tion between teacher, student, and subject matter is a fine example. In Democracy 
and Education, Dewey declares: 
Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communica-
tion . . . is educative. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an 
enlarged and changed experience. . . . Nor is the one who communicates 
left unaffected. Try the experiment of communicating, with fullness and 
accuracy, some experience to another . . . and you will find your own at-
titude toward your experience changing.63 
Because we make meaning together, teachers undergo transformation along with 
their students. Creative teachers enjoy such transactions because they allow them 
to learn and grow with their students. They are also means to the sort of immediate 
anoetic consummatory experiences that provide the aesthetic pleasures of teaching.
Thus far, we have concentrated on the artistic, mediating, and instrumental 
process of producing meaning and knowledge, but we have said little about the 
immediate, consummatory, and aesthetic experiences we create together. Con-
sider the following:
Communication is uniquely instrumental and uniquely final. It is in-
strumental as liberating us from the otherwise overwhelming pressure 
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of events and enabling us to live in a world of things that have meaning. 
It is final as a sharing in the objects and arts precious to a community, a 
sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened and solidified in the 
sense of communion. . . . The great evil lies in separating instrumental 
and final functions.64 
The great evil committed by many of Dewey’s critics arises because they confuse 
his instrumentalism with his entire philosophy. They ignore the fact that he wrote 
one of the most influential works on aesthetics of the twentieth century. What he 
says about the creation of meaning extends to the creation of knowledge, since “if 
scientific discourse is instrumental in function it also is capable of becoming an 
enjoyed object to those concerned in it.”65  We must not forget the distinction be-
tween mediating instrumentalist artistic production and immediate consumma-
tory aesthetic enjoyment of the product. We must also remember the importance 
of aesthetic appreciation to successful construction every step along the way as well 
as the importance of artistic production to aesthetic appreciation. 
We now turn to the artistic production of knowledge. Recall that the emer-
gence of the scientific method as an extension of practical trial and error brought 
theory and practice together in experimentalism. The Quest for Certainty is Dewey’s 
most extensive work on epistemology. In it, he rejects the very idea of indubitable 
knowledge while defending the participatory stance against that of the spectator. 
The work is subtitled “A Study of the Relation of Knowledge to Action.” The ac-
tion he has in mind is creative action. In a letter to Sidney Hook, Dewey proposed 
the title: The Quest for Certainty, a Study in the relations of Theory and Practice.66 
What unifies theory and practice is the construction and reconstruction of mean-
ing, knowledge, and value.
The following statement discloses the functional interdependency of theory 
and practice in production:
Theory separated from concrete doing and making is empty and futile; 
practice then becomes an immediate seizure of opportunities and en-
joyments which conditions afford without the direction which theory—
knowledge and ideas—has power to supply. The problem of the relation 
of theory and practice is not a problem of theory alone; it is that, but it is 
also the most practical problem of life. For it is the question of how intel-
ligence may inform action, and how action may bear the fruit of increased 
insight into meaning: a clear view of the values that are worth while and 
of the means by which they are to be made secure in experienced objects.67 
Let us further consider the importance of “making” in this passage.
The art of science has knowing (i.e., the construction of warranted assertions) 
as its aesthetic artifact. Dewey observes, “We know an object when we know how 
it is made, and we know how it is made in the degree in which we ourselves make 
E&C    EduCation and CulturE
18    JiM garrison
it.” 68 In defining his terms in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey declares: “The 
name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and 
ordered in settled form by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives 
of inquiry.”69 All ontology is an artifact of inquiry. Here is how Dewey sums up the 
argument of his Logic: “The position may be stated in the following language: All 
controlled inquiry and all institution of grounded assertion necessarily contains a 
practical factor; an activity of doing and making which reshapes antecedent exis-
tential material which sets the problem of inquiry.”70 We make values in much the 
same way we make meaning and knowledge.
Dewey titles Chapter 10 of The Quest for Certainty “The Construction of the 
Good.” It follows a chapter titled “The Supremacy of Method.” For him, the scientific 
method is the supreme artistic method for making warranted assertions and the 
handmaiden of other arts. We must also remember that science itself is a falsifiable, 
contingent, and evolving social construction continuous with common sense inqui-
ries, including indigenous methods, and is hence capable of modification by them. 
In a reply to a critic who misread The Quest for Certainty, Dewey begins by 
reminding the reader that inquiry “is reconstructive of antecedent situations, a 
reconstruction in which the self as knower is changed as well as the environing 
conditions.”71 What Dewey says next condenses his whole theory of the construc-
tion of value into a brief statement:
The function of the chapter on “The Supremacy of Method” is thus quite 
literally to prepare for the discussions of the next chapter, which is entitled 
“The Construction of Good.” That is to say, precisely because I hold that 
experimental method as union of theory and practice, of ideas and op-
erations directed by them, has supremacy over an antecedent situation, I 
also hold that one and the same method is to be used in determination of 
physical judgment and the value-judgments of morals. In consequence I 
hold that enjoyments, objects of desires as they arise, are not values, but 
are problematic material for construction—for creation if you will—of val-
ues. The dualism between scientific and moral knowing arose, as I point 
out, before the rise of the experimental method in scientific knowing.72 
We must avoid the philosophic fallacy of thinking that antecedent objects of de-
sire are values when they are only the existential materials of inquiry: “Without 
the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, be-
coming values when they re-issue in a changed form from intelligent behavior.”73 
The most complete statement of Dewey’s stance occurs in The Theory of Value, 
to which we now turn. For him, desire is constitutive of value, much as it is con-
stitutive of practical reasoning.74 However, the mere fact that we desire something 
does not make it valuable. Upon reflective inquiry many things we desire turn out 
not to be valuable at all.75 I still covet chocolate in spite of my high cholesterol. I 
should have inquired into the consequence of my desires sooner.
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Like any inquiry, value inquiry begins in a tensive problematic situation of 
disrupted functioning:
It follows that valuation in its connection with desire is linked to existen-
tial situations and that it differs with differences in its existential context. 
Since its existence depends upon the, situation, its adequacy depends 
upon its adaptation to the needs and demands imposed by the situation76.
Since we are participants and not spectators, our needs and the desires to which 
they give rise are part of the disrupted existential situation that initiates inquiry. 
The object of inquiry is to transform them (and the rest of the self) along with the 
environmental components into a single functionally coordinated situation. As with 
any inquiry, it involves nonexistential ideal ends-in-view that provide the guiding 
goal, good, or value of the inquiry.
Culturally entrenched customary rules and norms of any given culture estab-
lish moral oughts that guide practice, including moral practice. They specify what we 
should do; as Dewey says: “Such rules are used as criteria or ‘norms’ for judging the 
value of proposed modes of behavior.”77 Many insist that some rules and norms are 
intrinsically good (and right) in themselves; they are never means to anything more. 
While Dewey agrees that we have non-instrumental intrinsic consummatory experi-
ence of the values we create, in the next moment we may use them instrumentally. 
Customary values, along with rules and norms for their appraisal, are merely 
the results of unreflective cultural inquiry that may serve as hypotheses to be tested 
by intelligent inquiry and appraisal. Thus with abrupt swiftness, we are brought to 
description of inquiry similar to the one cited earlier:
For what is deliberation except weighing of various alternative desires (and 
hence end-values) in terms of the conditions that are the means of their 
execution, and which, as means, determine the consequences actually 
arrived at? There can be no control of the operation of foreseeing conse-
quences (and hence of forming ends-in-view) save in terms of conditions 
that operate as the causal conditions of their attainment. The proposition 
in which any object adopted as an end-in-view is statable (or explicitly 
stated) is warranted in just the degree to which existing conditions have 
been surveyed and appraised in their capacity as means.78
Predictably,
The form of an attained end or consequence is always the same: that of ad-
equate coordination. The content or involved matter of each successive result 
differs from that of its predecessors; for, while it is a reinstatement of a unified 
ongoing action, after a period of interruption through conflict and need, it 
is also an enactment of a new state of affairs. It has the qualities and proper-
ties appropriate to its being the consummatory resolution of a previous state 
of activity in which there was a peculiar need, desire, and end-in- view.79
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In conclusion, if we unify theory with practice, we may use the same paradigm for 
the intelligent production of meaning, knowing, and valuing, thereby obviating 
the functional independencies among them.
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